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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of RICARDO RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
-againstROBERT DENNISON, N.Y.S. DIVISION
OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-07-ST7463 Index No. 874-07
Appearances:

Ricardo Rodriguez
Inmate No. 96-A-6234
Petitioner, Pro Se
Wallkill Correctional Facility
P.O. Box G
Prison Road
Wallkill, NY 12589-0286
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Richard Lombardo,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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The petitioner, an inmate at Wallkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated September 7,

2005 in which petitioner was denied discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving
concurrent terms of robbery lst degree (nine to eighteen years) and grand larceny second
degree (three years four months to ten years). These offenses were committed while the
petitioner was on probation for a youthful offender weapon possession adjudication. He was
re-sentenced on the youthful offender adjudication. He is currently serving an aggregate
sentence of ten and one third years to twenty two years. Among the many arguments set
forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous
information in making its determination. He indicates that the Parole Decision incorrectly
states that his convictions were the result of a plea, when in reality he was convicted after
trial. He indicates that his criminal history incorrectly recites that he was convicted of
attempted murder in the second degree and assault, when in fact he was acquitted of those
charges. The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board exceeded the guideline range under
9 NYCRR 8001.3. He contends that the Parole Board failed to consider his institutional

record, and violated his rights to due process. He points out that he has certificates of
completion for institutional programs including Aggression Replacement Training, Alcohol
and Substance Abusc: Treatment, Transitional Services I and 11, and is currently working on
a certificate of earlied eligibility. In petitioner’s view the Parole Board inappropriately
speculated on his future

The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner
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release on parole are set forth as follows:
“Upon a review of the record, personal interview and due
deliberation it is the determination of the panel that parole is
denied. You are presently incarcerated upon you conviction of
robbery lstand larceny auto 2nd,both by plea. You committed
an in concert gun point car jacking, shooting one of the car’s
occupants. You were on probation at the time for a weapon
related YO adjudication. Your history also includes another YO
adjudication, as well. All factors considered, the panel
concludes that discretionary release is inappropriate at this time.
The gratuitous violence exhibited in the instant offenses, your
proclivity for guns and your negative response to past
correctional influences all militate strongly against release.
There is a reasonable probability that you will not remain at
liberty without violating the law.”
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]).
3
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“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau

v.

Hammock, 103 AD2d 914 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of in-ationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention

(see

Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting

Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
by the Parole Board

(see

Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release (including plans to become an electrician). The decision was sufficiently detailed to
inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements
of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept.,
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept.,
4
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19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of
the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division
of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State
Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd
Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’scriminal history (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d
653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d
92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 11). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set
forth in the first sentence of Executive Law

tj

2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v

Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3“‘ Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board
may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the
crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history,
together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible
with the welhre of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the]
crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Purio v New York State Division
of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other
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citations omitted).
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the
guideline range (see,9 NYCRR 8001.3), the guidelines ''are intended only as a guide, and
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each
individual case" (see, 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division
of Parole, 290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not
serve as a basis to overturn the Board's decision.
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 5 259-i, since it does not create
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (seeBarna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2"dCir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With respect to petitioner's claim that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous
information, the parole interview reflects that the Commissioner Crowe initially commented
that the petitioner shot the victim. At that point the petitioner pointed out that he was
acquitted of the charges of attempted murder 2"ddegree and assault 1'' degree. Commissioner
Crowe thereafter corrected himself by acknowledging that the petitioner was not convicted
of the shooting. The determination itself only mentions convictions for robbery first degree
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and grand larceny auto second degree, and never suggests that the petitioner was convicted
of attempted murder or assault. While the determination does mention that the petitioner was
convicted of participating in a car jacking'"in concert" with his accomplices, and that during
the car jacking an occupant of the car was shot, the determination does not indicate that he
shot the victim. The Court finds that petitioner failed to establish that any of the alleged
inaccuracies resulted in a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights or that they involved
matters which affected respondent's decision to deny parole

(see, Matter of Williams v

Travis 11 AD3d 788, 789-790 [3rd Dept., 20041; Matter of Rossnev v New York State

-3

Board of Parole, 267 AD2d 648,649 [3rd Dept., 19991; Matter of Howard v New York State
Bd. of Parole, 272 AD2d 731 [3rd Dept., 20001; Matter of Richburg: v New York State
Division of Parole, 284 AD2d 685, 686 [3rd Dept., 20011); Matter of Morel v Travis, 278
AD2d 580 [3rd Dept., 20001, appeal dismissed 96 NY2d 752 [200 11). While it appears that
the petitioner was convicted of the robbery and grand larceny charges after trial, rather than
by plea, the petitioner fails to demonstrate how, or in what manner that fact in any material
way affected the outcome of the parole determination.
The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta v State
uL N c w l'ol-kUivisiun u l l ' q - , 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002],11- drni-rd 98 NY2d 604).

To the extent that the petitioner claims that his criminal history record is inaccurate,

the Court is of the view that his only redress is to attempt to correct any alleged inaccuracies
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under the procedure set forth in 7 NYCRR Part 5. Moreover, the petitioner may not, in a
proceeding seeking review of a determination denying parole, challenge the accuracy of
iiiatters contained in his pre-sentence report (see Matter of Williams v Travis, supra, at 789).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds thcm to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
DecisiodOrder/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

ENTER
Dated:

July 5 ,2007
Troy, New York

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:

1.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated February 1,2007, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated April 9,2007, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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